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CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF SPORTS AGENTS: IT IS
TIME TO RELINE THE PLAYING FIELD
Many regard Joe Star as the nation's premier college bas-
ketball player as he enters his senior year at State X University.
Star grew up in poverty, and his family, with whom he is still very
close, continues to struggle. Star hopes that his athletic skills will
enable him to sign a lucrative professional basketball contract
and help provide for his family.
Cagey Agent is a 'financial manager" who operates a sports
agency in State X. Agent pays $1,000 to a State X University
employee in exchange for an introduction to Star. At this meet-
ing, Agent gives Star a business card that reads: Cagey Agent-
Attorney/Certified Public Accountant-Sports Agent for Top
Professional Athletes. Agent is not a Certified Public Account-
ant. Over the next several days, Agent takes Star to concerts,
sporting events and expensive restaurants, and buys him expen-
sive clothing and jewelry. Star reveals to Agent his family's poor
financial condition. Agent proposes to help Star and his family
by advancing him $10,000 in return for Star's agreement to have
Agent represent Star when he turns pro. Agent tells Star that this
is a routine procedure, that he will postdate the agreement until
after the college basketball season is complete, and that Star
should tell no one of this agreement.
After a successful senior season, Star signs a five-year
$9,000,000 contract to play professional basketball. Star also re-
ceives a $1,000,000 signing bonus which Agent immediately
takes as his 10% commission, leaving Star with no money until
he receives his first paycheck Later that year, an NCAA investi-
gation uncovers Star's dealings with Agent while he was attend-
ing State X University. The NCAA declares that this conduct
made Star ineligible to compete at State X University, and ac-
cordingly, State X University must forfeit $300,000 in revenue
earned from post-season play. Meanwhile, Star, who wishes to
buy a new home for his family, had his home loan application
rejected by his bank and requests a meeting with Agent who con-
trols all his money.
Star meets with Agent who assures him that his money is
'"safe" and proceeds to give Star a check to purchase the home.
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Agent, however, is unable to provide any detailed documentation
of Star'sfinancial condition upon request. The NCAA and State
X University contemplate bringing a suit against Agent; however,
they decide against it after weighing their chances for success
against the costs of litigation. Finally, although State X's
"Sports Agent Statute" requires sports agents to register with
State X, an exemption is given to attorneys and financial manag-
ers This enables Agent to avoid registering and complying with
the statute's other provisions.
Star, State X University, the NCAA and collegiate and pro-
fessional athletics in general have been injured by Cagey Agent's
conduct. Agent, however, has not encountered any penalties or
sanctions, and Agent continues to operate his business un-
changed. What can be done?
I. INTRODUCTION
As agents' fees and incomes have skyrocketed,I the lucrativeness of
the profession has resulted in incredible growth in the number of practic-
ing sports agents.2 The rise in the salaries and other income of athletes,
the growth in the number of player agents, and the expansion of the role
of the agent in today's sports world can be isolated as the roots of some
of the profession's current problems. Athletes who were once thought to
have been protected by their agents are now perceived as needing protec-
tion from those agents.'
This Comment explores a relatively new attempt at regulating the
conduct of professional sports agents-the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions against agents.' First, this Comment examines current regulations
that impose civil liability on sports agents and uses the problems inherent
in these regulatory schemes to illustrate why criminal penalties are the
only effective means available to cure the present abuses in the profes-
1. The rise in agents' income can be illustrated by the corresponding rise in athletes'
salaries. In 1967, the average major league baseball player earned $19,000. Fichtenbaum,
Rosenblatt & Sandomir, How Golden the Goose, SPORTS INC., Jan. 2, 1989, at 29. Assuming
an average agent commission of five percent, an agent's income from a single player would be
$950. In 1988, the average major league salary had ballooned to $438,000. Id. Assuming the
same five percent commission, an agent's income from a single player would be $21,900.
2. Current reports estimate the number of agents between 2,000 and 20,000. Sobel, The
Regulation of Sports Agents: An Analytical Primer, 39 BAYLOR L. Rv., 701, 703 (1987);
Steinberg, Time to Revise Game Rules?, SPORTING NEWS, Nov. 16, 1987, at 10.
3. See Neff, Den of Vipers--A Sports Scourge: Bad Agents, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct.
19, 1987, at 77 [hereinafter Neff, Den of Vipers].
4. See infra notes 73-297 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of agent crimi-
nal liability.
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sion. Second, this Comment examines state statutory provisions
designed to impose criminal penalties and specifically focuses on the pro-
visions of the Alabama Athlete Agents Regulatory Act of 1987 (the
Act).5 Third, the Comment analyzes the case of United States v. Wal-
ters6 which appears to be the first federal attempt at criminal prosecution
of sports agents for misconduct relating to the recruitment and represen-
tation of athletes. Specifically, this section focuses on the numerous fed-
eral statutory provisions under which sports agents Norby Walters and
Lloyd Bloom were prosecuted. Finally, this Comment examines the cur-
rent status of the profession in light of the prosecution and subsequent
acquittal of agents Walters and Bloom and the author proposes federal
legislation that imposes criminal sanctions on player agents.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The number of documented cases of abuses and indiscretions by
agents grows daily. 7 Many attempts to control this epidemic problem,
however, have proved unsuccessful. First, although agents have always
been subject to civil liability,8 this process typically provides little relief
to the violated player, and it does not serve as a deterrent to future agent
misconduct.9 An unscrupulous agent can merely factor into his fees a
possible damage award as a cost of doing business. Second, non-legisla-
5. ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-1 to 41 (Supp. 1989). This Comment specifically examines Ala-
bama's statute because it represents a significant attempt by a state legislature to regulate
sports agents through criminal statutes. Additionally, prior to the enactment of Alabama's
statute, the state made a unique attempt to prosecute an agent under a statute prohibiting
tampering with sports contests. See infra notes 73-151 and accompanying text for a discussion
of these state provisions.
6. 711 F. Supp. 1435 (N.D. Ill. 1989), rev'd, Nos. 89-2352, 89-2353, 89-3285, 89-3286,
slip op. (7th Cir. Sept. 17, 1990).
7. Dennis Gilbert, a Beverly Hills baseball agent who represents at least 25 major league
players, including Jose Canseco, has been reported to be currently under investigation by the
Major League Baseball Players Association for illegally soliciting clients and retaining them
with inducements. Hudson, Players Association Investigating Canseco's Agent, L.A. Times,
July 11, 1990, at Cl, col. 2. Lance Luchnick, a Texas sports agent who represents former
University of Alabama linebacker Keith McCants, recently pled guilty to a reduced misde-
meanor charge of violating Alabama's sports agent registration law and was fined $5,000. Mc-
Cants' Agent Fined $5,000 for Violating Registration Law, L.A. Times, May 21, 1990, at P10,
col. 1. Luchnick is currently being sued by seven National Basketball Association first-round
draft picks and is named in 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Munson, Contract Killings, The Nat'l
Sports Daily, June 29, 1990, at 37, col. 1. Recently, three sports agents pled guilty to mail
fraud in Gainesville, Fla., and are locked up in a halfway house for six months. Their pay-
ments to University of Florida athletes during their NCAA eligibility may force the school to
forfeit nearly $1,000,000 in revenue from post-season play. Munson, supra, at 36, col. 2.
8. See infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of civil liability and an
example of a civil suit against a sports agent.
9. Sobel, supra note 2, at 722.
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tive regulation I° lacks any mandatory participation by agents and has
virtually no enforcement power."1 Finally, state legislative regulations,
such as those imposed by California,12 are hampered by limitations on
jurisdiction as well as other problems.' 3 As a result, sports agents al-
most universally ignore state regulations. 4
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of the Player Agent Profession
Professional athletics in America dates back to shortly after the
American Civil War when the first professional baseball league was
formed. 5 In those days, athletes were paid "next to nothing,"' 6 thus
their primary motivation for participating in athletics was a love for the
game. Low salaries and the generally tame business environment that
suriounded competitive sports marked the infancy of professional
athletics.
As the country moved through the Industrial Revolution and into
the twentieth century, professional athletics grew in popularity. 17 Pro-
fessional sports evolved out of its modest beginnings as athletes with
heightened skills contributed to professional sports' refinement and mod-
ernization." During these early times, the few sports agents' 9 that ex-
10. See infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems with
non-legislative regulation.
12. See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems with
state legislative regulations.
14. See Comment, Regulation of Sports Agents: Since at First It Hasn't Succeeded, Try
Federal Legislation, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1078 (1988) (authored by David Lawrence
Dunn).
15. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED BASEBALL: REPORT OF THE SUB-
COMMITTEE ON THE STUDY OF MONOPOLY POWER, H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
16-19 (1952).
16. In 1866, a complaint was made that the Philadelphia Athletics were paying three of
their ballplayers the "high" salary of twenty dollars per week for their athletic services. Id. at
17.
17. See 28 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 175 (15th ed. 1988).
18. See id. at 177.
19. Generally, the word "agent" describes "a person authorized by another to act on his
account and under his control." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 comment e (1958).
For purposes of this Comment, the word "agent" will be used to represent a sports agent,
athlete agent, or sports representative. For background information on agents, see generally
Kohn, Sports Agents Representing Athletes: Being Certified Means Never Having To Say You're
Qualified, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Winter 1988, at 1; Massey, The Crystal Cruise Cut Short: A
Survey of the Increasing Regulatory Influences Over the Athlete-Agent in the National Football
League, 1 ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 53 (1984); Ruxin, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: The Student.
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isted worked for the "major stars" in sports and their primary function
was to assist in contract negotiations.20
It was not until the late-1960's that sports agents rose to promi-
nence, when the growth of players' salaries, complexity of contract
terms2' and other intricacies in the negotiating process exposed athletes
to potentially unfair treatment at the negotiating table.22 Representation
by a skilled negotiator removed some of this unfairness and, as a result,
salaries soared and athletes became wealthier.23 Thus, the benefits that
sports agents brought to their clients helped to establish the agents' role
in modem professional athletics.
Today, professional sports is a booming industry.24 The role of the
professional athlete has expanded to a social status well beyond the
boundaries of the playing field as many in society view athletes as role
Athlete, the NCAA, and Agents, 8 J.C. & U.L. 347 (1981-82), reprinted in LAW & AMATEUR
SPoRTS 191 (R. Waicukaski ed. 1982); Sobel, supra note 2; Note, The Agent-Athlete Relation-
ship in Professional and Amateur Sports The Inherent Potential for Abuse and the Need for
Regulation, 30 BUFFALO L. REv. 815 (1981) [hereinafter Note, The Agent-Athlete Relation-
ship]; Note, Agents of Professional Athletes, 15 NEW ENG. L. REv. 545 (1980) [hereinafter
Note, Agents of Professional Athletes].
20. See Sobel, supra note 2, at 702-03. One of the earliest recorded examples of agent
representation occurred in 1925, when the "Galloping Ghost," Red Grange, signed a $100,000
contract to play with the Chicago Bears that was negotiated by his manager, C.C. "Cash and
Carry" Pyle. Ruxin, supra note 19, at 347 (citing M. PACHTER, CHAMPIONS OF AMERICAN
SPORT 266 (1981)). It should be noted that some agents in these early times offered other
services as well. For example, Babe Ruth was represented by "a former sports cartoonist
named Christy Walsh, who steered the Babe into annuities, [which enabled Babe] to weather
the stock market crash of 1929." Neff, Den of Vipers, supra note 3, at 76.
21. Contracts began routinely to include provisions calling for deferred payments, incen-
tives, signing bonuses, guarantees and non-cash compensation. Sobel, supra note 2, at 705.
22. See Ehrhardt & Rodgers, Tightening the Defense Against Offensive Sports Agents, 16
FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 634, 637 (1989); Neff, Den of Vipers, supra note 3, at 76. Additionally,
before 1968, National Football League teams did not allow players to be accompanied by their
advisors during contract negotiations. Sobel, supra note 2, at 703 n.3.
23. See Note, The Agent-Athlete Relationship, supra note 19, at 818-19. Recent average
salaries in the four major professional sports leagues evidenced the growth of this business.
The average salaries for the four major leagues in 1988 were: the National Basketball Associa-
tion, $587,000; Major League Baseball, $438,000; the National Football League, $240,000;
and, the National Hockey League, $188,000. Fichtenbaum, Rosenblatt & Sandomir, supra
note 1, at 29.
24. See McManus, Sports, TV & Money: An Explosion Without End; When Money Talks,
NBA Is Ready To Listen, L.A. Times, June 25, 1989, at C5, col. 1. Recently, the television
networks bidded for an estimated $2.7 billion in sports television rights contracts with: the
National Football League, the National Basketball Association, the NCAA basketball tourna-
ment, the College Football Association and Big Ten/Pac-10 football, and the domestic rights
to the 1994 Winter Olympic Games. Id. Additionally, sports marketing is worth $2.6 billion
annually in the United States in event sponsorships and another $8 to $12 billion annually in
related advertising, promotion and merchandising. Cox, Masters of the Green, USA Today,
April 6, 1990, at 1B, col. 3.
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models.2" Many professional athletes endorse both sports and non-sports
products.26 Additionally, the modem athlete is expected to contribute to
his or her community.27 As the role of the athlete has expanded, so has
the role of the modem sports agent.
Initially, the agent's role was limited to the negotiation of player
contracts. 2 Today that role encompasses four recognized functions of
sports agents: negotiating the athlete's employment agreement;29 solicit-
ing, negotiating and securing additional income opportunities such as
commercial product endorsements;3 ° providing financial advice and in-
come management services;31 and providing general guidance on legal
and tax matters.32 An individual agent provides some combination of
these services, and the agent's fee is commensurate with the number of
services he or she offers.33
Ideally, an agent's principal role is to maximize the athlete's earning
potential while establishing a foundation for the athlete's lifetime finan-
cial stability.34 Too often, agents neglect this role by abandoning their
professional and moral responsibilities in favor of personal greed.35
Although many agents are competent, honest and trustworthy, a sub-
stantial number prove to be unscrupulous and deceitful, thereby posing a
severe threat to both athletes and organized sports. 36 This group of "bad
agents" 37 has drawn public contempt toward sports agents in general,
and has focused attention on the problems that plague the profession.38
25. See Steinberg, supra note 2, at 11.
26. For a brief discussion of product endorsements by professional athletes, see Sobel,
supra note 2, at 707-08.
27. Former New York Jet defensive end, Mark Gastineau, contributed $500 to New
York's Mt. Sinai Hospital every time he sacked the opposing quarterback. O'Connell & Wel-
ing, How Leigh Steinberg Rises Above His 'Sleazoid Profession,' Bus. WEEK, Jan. 14, 1985, at
63; see id.; Steinberg, supra note 2, at 11, col. 5, for other examples of professional athletes
contributing to their communities.
28. See Sobel, supra note 2, at 705.
29. Id. at 705-07.
30. Id. at 707-08.
31. Id. at 708.
32. Id. at 709.
33. Agent fees range anywhere from two to ten percent of the contract or endorsement
value. See NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS' ASSOCIATION, NFLPA REGULATIONS
GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS § 4(c) (1983) [hereinafter NFLPA REG.].
34. Ehrhardt & Rodgers, supra note 22, at 639.
35. Id. In addition to refining and drafting a player contract or endorsement agreement,
an agent's professional responsibilities include ensuring that his client understands all the legal
rights and responsibilities under these negotiated agreements. Id.
36. Id.
37. Neff, Den of Vipers, supra note 3, at 76.
38. Id.
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Common problems associated with player agents fall into five major
categories: (1) income mismanagement; (2) excessive fees; (3) conflicts of
interest; (4) incompetence; and (5) overly aggressive client recruitment
practices.39 These types of indiscretions have exposed agents to civil lia-
bility and have resulted in both legislative and non-legislative
regulation.4°
B. Agent Wrongdoings and Civil Liability
General principles of agency and contract dominate the vast number
of civil suits brought against sports agents.41 Thus, player-agent disputes
are generally treated similar to other service contracts such as those be-
tween an automobile owner and his mechanic. However, a successful
claimant, with either a settlement or court judgment, will normally only
receive compensatory ex post facto damages.42 This is because the ma-
jority of civil suits brought against sports agents allege income misman-
agement, for example, failed investments,43 which generally only involve
negligent conduct for which punitive damages are not awarded.' Conse-
quently, civil suits under agency and contract theories do not provide
39. Sobel, supra note 2, at 710.
40. Currently 19 states have in place legislation aimed directly at sports agents. See ALA.
CODE §§ 8-26-1 to -41 (Supp. 1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-48-101 to -203 (Supp. 1989);
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500-1547 (West 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 468.451-.457 (West Supp.
1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-4A-1 to -18 (Harrison Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-46-
4-1 to -4 (Burns Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 9A.1-.12 (West 1989); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 518.010,.080 (Mflichie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-430
(West 1987 & Supp. 1990); MD. CODE ANN. art. 56, §§ 632-640 (Supp. 1989); MIcH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.643(5) (Callaghan 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.33 (West Supp. 1990); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 73-41-1 to -23 (Supp. 1988); Nnv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 398.005-.095, 598.065
(Michie Supp. 1989); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4771.01-.99 (Page Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 70 §§ 821.61-.71 (West 1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7107 (Purdon Supp. 1989);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-7-2101 to -2109 (Supp. 1989); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 131.001-.008 (Vernon Supp. 1990), TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871 (Vernon Supp.
1990). For an explanation of the laws in Alabama, California, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and
Texas, see Sobel, supra note 2, at 724-80. For an explanation of the laws in Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Minnesota, Ohio, and Tennessee, see Ehrhardt and Rogers, supra note 22, at 652-74.
41. See Sobel, supra note 2, at 708-09; Note, The Agent-Athlete Relationship, supra note 19,
at 833-34. A publicized example of a civil suit employing contract and agency principles to an
agent-athlete dispute was the case of professional basketball star Kareem Abdul-Jabbar against
his agent, Tom Collins, for 59 million dollars, alleging numerous violations including breach of
fiduciary duty and breach of contract. Papanek, A Lot of Hurt, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct.
19, 1987, at 89. Abdul-Jabbar's case was recently settled and as part of the settlement agree-
ment, no details of the arrangement may be disclosed to the public. Munson, supra note 7, at
37, col. 4.
42. Compensatory damages generally only "compensate the injured party for the injury
sustained, and nothing more." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1979).
43. See Sobel, supra note 2, at 719.
44. See Note, Agents of Professional Athletes, supra note 19, at 563-69 (describing a com-
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adequate redress. The application of general legal principles only pro-
tects the players after an injury has occurred and essentially offers no
protection prior to their entering into a contractual relationship with the
agent a.4  As a result, an inundation of other mechanisms designed to reg-
ulate player agents have been implemented in an attempt to provide
agents with incentive to act fairly from the outset of the player-agent
relationship."
Agent regulation can be classified into two groups:47 (1) non-legisla-
tive regulation, normally imposed by private groups such as the Associa-
tion of Representatives of Professional Athletes (ARPA),4 8 and (2)
legislative regulation, imposed through state statutes.
1. Non-legislative regulation
The ARPA seeks to improve the standards of agents and is the only
self-regulating organization within the sports agent profession. It has
adopted a Code of Ethics49 and has encouraged agent competence by
sponsoring professional education programs." Under this Code of Eth-
ics, the ARPA has also attempted to promulgate broad rules designed to
combat the problems of incompetent representation, improper client re-
cruitment practices and excessive fees."1 Unfortunately, because ARPA
membership is voluntary, its rules are overbroad, and the organization
lacks any developed enforcement mechanisms, ARPA regulations have
been rendered completely ineffective.52
Other associations, such as the National Collegiate Athletic Associ-
pensatory judgment awarded to several NFL players against their agent in an unreported
case).
45. Sobel, supra note 2, at 722. Pre-contract protection is afforded in many of the state
statutes which require the inclusion of specific warning statements to the athlete in the signed
representation agreement. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of
'these warnings.
46. See infra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
47. Regulations imposed by various players' associations, such as the National Football
League Players' Association (NFLPA), are often recognized as a third group of agent regula-
tions. See Sobel, supra note 2, at 724-86; Comment, supra note 14, at 1043-49. Although this
group of regulations appears to be effective because they prevent athlete-members from using
non-certified agents in contracting with the league's teams, these regulations also possess limi-
tations in content, scope, and jurisdiction that hinder their effectiveness. See Sobel, supra note
2, at 724-86; Comment, supra note 14, at 1043-49.
48. Comment, supra note 14, at 1040-41.
49. ASSOCIATION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES, DIRECTORY AND
CODE OF ETHICS 3-8 (1985), reprinted in G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, SPORTS
LAW 284-90 (1986).
50. Comment, supra note 14, at 1040.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1040-41.
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ation (NCAA), have also encountered difficulty in their attempts at agent
regulation.53 Groups like the NCAA are internal bodies in the sense that
they derive all their powers from their own constitutions.54 Thus they
have no power to regulate player agents, either directly or indirectly
through student-athletes. 5 Since sports agents are not required to follow
the NCAA rules, most simply ignore them. 6 As a result, it is apparent
that non-legislative regulations by the ARPA and the NCAA "lack the
scope and enforcement power to meaningfilly attack" the problems with
player agents.
5 7
2. Legislative regulation- California's legislative attempt
Legislative regulation offers an alternative solution to the problem of
inadequate or improper representation. Legislative regulations do not
possess some of the problems illustrated by their non-legislative counter-
parts because legislative regulations apply to all agents in a given juris-
diction and carry with them the enforcement power of the state.5 8 This
form of regulation which has been enacted in California, has, however,
proven to be equally ineffective.
In 1981, California passed the Athlete Agencies Act (the California
Act), 9 the nation's first statutory regulation of sports agents." The Cali-
fornia Act contains numerous licensing requirements for agents includ-
ing educational and training prerequisites.61 The California Act also
imposes licensing fees and other charges on practicing agents, and even
requires the posting of a $25,000 surety bond to ensure compensation to
53. For a comprehensive analysis of the NCAA's authority and the deficiencies inherent in
its rules, see Note, Judicial Review of Disputes Between Athletes and the National Collegiate
Athletic Association, 24 STAN. L. REv. 903 (1972).
54. Sobel, supra note 2, at 728.
55. Id. Although NCAA rules prohibit players from further participation in their sport
upon a discovered rule violation (e.g., signing a representation agreement with an agent prior
to the expiration of the athlete's collegiate eligibility), the majority of athletes are either una-
ware of the NCAA rules or blatantly ignore them in hopes of not getting caught. See R.
RUXIN, AN ATHLETE'S GUIDE TO AGENTS 35-36 (1982) (reporting contentions that 60% to
75% of top-round NFL draftees had made commitments to be represented by agents before
their NCAA eligibility had expired). The current rules provide no direct sanctions against
agents, therefore, they have little, if any, deterrent effect on agent conduct. See also infra note
329 for a discussion on the fairness of the current NCAA rules.
56. See Comment, supra note 14, at 1042-43.
57. Id. at 1078.
58. Id. at 1049.
59. Athlete Agencies Act, ch. 929, 1981 Cal. Stat. 3487 (codified as amended at CAL. LAB.
CODE §§ 1500-1547 (West 1989)).
60. Comment, supra note 14, at 1049.
61. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1511(d), 1512 (West 1989).
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an athlete for damages resulting from possible agent misconduct.62 The
California Act further requires all representation contracts to be on an
approved form6 3 and also sets a maximum fee percentage."4 Violation of
most of this act's provisions can result in license revocation or suspension
or even criminal liability.6"
Although the California regulations appear to address many of the
inadequacies of non-legislative regulation, most agents have ignored the
California Act. 6 The reasons for agent non-compliance include jurisdic-
tional limitations67 and the fact that this act only covers those agents
who engage in "contract negotiations."6 As a result, the California Act
does not apply to agents who perform only money-handling, investment
or promotional services.6 9 Further, attorney-agents who are members of
the State Bar of California are not considered "athlete agents" and are
not covered by this act when "acting as legal counsel."170 Although the
California Act was a legislature's first attempt at state statutory regula-
tion of sports agents, many other state schemes that followed have suf-
fered equally poor results.71
IV. ANALYSIS
Both non-legislative and legislative regulations have been ineffective
in deterring sports agent misconduct. Congress has not yet responded by
enacting a federal criminal statute; however, some states, recognizing the
growing number of agent indiscretions, have attempted to impose crimi-
62. See id. § 1519.
63. See id. § 1530.
64. See id. § 1531(b).
65. Id. §§ 1527, 1547. See infra notes 72-324 and accompanying text regarding criminal
liability in general.
66. See Comment, supra note 14, at 1051; see also CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500-1547. As of
early 1988, only 17 agents had registered under the California Act and were subject to its
provisions. Kohn, supra note 19, at 11.
67. See Comment, supra note 14, at 1051. Some agents, although they transact business in
California, lack requisite "minimum contacts" to be subject to the jurisdiction of the state. Id.
Although the Labor Commissioner considers the Act to cover not only agents with a residence
or office in California, but also out-of-state agents with client athletes living or working in the
state, the scope of California's jurisdiction is unclear and as a result, out-of-state agents gener-
ally use the vagueness of jurisdiction requirements to excuse their ignorance of the Act. Id. at
1051-52.
68. Id. at 1052.
69. Id.; see CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500-1547.
70. Comment, supra note 14, at 1053.
71. Oklahoma's statute provides a useful example of a state statutory scheme that was
poorly drafted and that has not been complied with by sports agents. See id. at 1056-59, for a
discussion of the inadequacies in this legislation.
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nal sanctions against sports agents.7 2 Lack of state participation, juris-
dictional limitations and statutory exemptions, however, have restricted
the effectiveness of these state attempts, thereby illustrating the need for
federal action in this area.
A. A State's Valiant Attempts at Imposing Criminal Sanctions on
Sports Agents
This Comment next examines Alabama's attempt at imposing crimi-
nal sanctions on sports agents which represents one of the more signifi-
cant state efforts to date. First, this Comment examines Alabama's
attempted prosecution of a sports agent under a statute that prohibits
tampering with a sports contest.73 Second, this Comment examines Ala-
bama's legislative attempt through a comprehensive statute that imposes
stiff criminal penalties for agent violations.74
1. Alabama's unique attempt at criminal prosecution of a sports
agent-A bernethy v. State7"
Kevin Porter was a star football player attending the University of
Auburn on a football scholarship.76 On August 3, 1987, prior to the start
of his senior year, Porter signed a three-year contract with sports agent
Jim Abernethy at Abernethy's office in Atlanta, Georgia. 77 In the con-
tract, Abernethy agreed to "represent [Porter] in the negotiation of pro-
fessional sporting contracts and commercial endorsement contracts.
78
Under the terms of the contract, Porter was to pay Abernethy five per-
cent of Porter's base salary for each contract that Abernethy negotiated
on Porter's behalf and ten percent of Porter's endorsement fees negoti-
ated by Abernethy.79
Prior to signing the contract, Porter revealed to Abernethy that "he
needed money because his mother was in serious financial trouble."80
Abernethy gave Porter a lump-sum payment of $2,00081 upon signing
the contract, in an effort to help Porter and to secure the representation
72. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 468.453(3), .454(2) (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 43-4A-11(a) (Harrison Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-4-4 (Burns Supp. 1989).
73. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-143 (1982).
74. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-1 to -41 (Supp. 1989).
75. 545 So. 2d 185 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
76. Id. at 186. Porter was ranked the number one cornerback in the nation when he en-
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agreement. In addition, Abernethy agreed to give Porter $900 each
month, plus $400 for Thanksgiving and $500 for Christmas.82 Abeme-
thy also promised to pay Porter $100 for each interception he made.
3
Porter received $900 in September and that same amount in October of
1987, but the payments then stopped because Abernethy dissolved his
sports agency the following month.
84
Porter played in all eleven of Auburn's 1987-1988 season football
games.85 However, after a December 15, 1987 newspaper article in the
Atlanta Constitution publicized Porter's dealings with Abernethy, Au-
burn University and the NCAA declared Porter ineligible and banned
him from playing in the Sugar Bowl.86
Abernethy was indicted and, at a jury trial, was convicted of tam-
pering with a sports contest.87 The indictment charged that:
Abernethy... did with intent to influence the outcome of a
sports contest... knowingly tamper with a sports participant
... in a manner contrary to the rules and usages purporting to
govern the sports contest in question, to-wit: by providing
[Porter] with monetary consideration pursuant to a contract re-
lating to [Porter's] athletic performance and athletic services, in
violation of governing rules of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association and its Constitution [and] in violation of [section]
13A-11-143 [of the] Alabama Code 1975.88
Section 13A-11-143 of the Alabama Code89 defines the crime of
tampering with a sports contest. It provides, in part:
(a) A person commits the crime of tampering with a sports
contest if, with intent to influence the outcome of a sports con-
test, he... [t]ampers with any sports participant... in a man-
ner contrary to the rules and usages purporting to govern the
sports contest in question.... Tampering with a sports contest






87. Id.; see ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-143 (1982). Abernethy was also indicted for commercial
bribery and unlawful trade practice, but was acquitted at a jury trial of both of these charges.
Abernethy, 545 So. 2d at 186.
88. Abernethy, 545 So. 2d at 187. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-143 (1982).
89. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-143.
90. Id.
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Although the statute on its face appears to be an effective means of con-
trolling player agents, it has been impotent in its application.
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Abernethy's con-
viction in a decision which construed the tampering statute in a manner
quite favorable to Abernethy and sports agents in general. 9 ' First, the
court noted that Abernethy's tampering with Porter's eligibility in viola-
tion of the NCAA rules was not a criminal offense unless done with the
specific intent to influence the outcome of a sports contest.92 Then, the
court construed the term "outcome of a sports event" as used in the stat-
ute as meaning the final score of the football game.9 3 On appeal the state
argued that Abernethy possessed the necessary criminal intent under two
theories: (1) that Abernethy knew of the NCAA rules prohibiting the
professionalization of athletes;94 and (2) that he promised to give incen-
tives of $100 to Porter for each interception he made.95
Under its first theory of intent, the state argued that Abernethy
knowingly intended that Auburn University play an athlete ineligible
under NCAA rules,96 which in turn risked a potential automatic loss
through forfeiture of each game of that season.97 The court dismissed
this theory rather easily, by stating its position that "even an intentional
violation of the [NCAA] rules resulting in aplayer being declared ineligi-
ble does not constitute the offense of tampering with a sports contest...
unless an intent to ... influence the final score of the game [also ex-
isted]." 98 Further, the court reasoned that any connection between the
intentional violation of the NCAA rules by Abernethy and an Auburn
loss through forfeiture was speculative and not based on a legitimate in-
ference from the evidence. 99
Under its second theory of intent, the state argued that by providing
the performance incentives to Porter, Abernethy intended to give himself
an advantage over other agents and also to heighten Porter's draft value,
91. Abernethy, 545 So. 2d at 187. The court followed the rule of statutory construction
adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court in Clements v. State, which held that "criminal stat-
utes are to be strictly construed in favor of those persons sought to be subjected to their opera-
tion." 370 So. 2d 723, 725 (Ala. 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Beck v. State, 396 So.
2d 645 (Ala. 1980).
92. Abernethy, 545 So. 2d at 188.
93. Id.
94. Id. See NCAA CONsT. art. III, § l(a), (c), (g)(5), reprinted in MANUAL OF THE NA-
TIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 7-52 (1988).
95. Abernethy, 545 So. 27d at 189.
96. See NCAA CONST. art. III, § 1(c).
97. Abernethy, 545 So. 2d at 188.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 189.
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thereby increasing the amount of money both Abernethy and Porter
would receive upon Porter signing a National Football League con-
tract."° In dismissing the second theory of intent, the court noted that
the offer of performance incentives did not support a legitimate inference
that Abernethy intended to influence the outcome of a sports contest. 1 1
The court further emphasized that, like the first theory, the second the-
ory showed "that Abernethy intended for Porter to play every game and
that having Porter declared ineligible would be against Abernethy's own
financial interest and frustrate the very purpose of the agent contract."' 10 2
Additionally, the trial testimony of Porter indicated that the perform-
ance incentives did not have a detrimental effect on his performance in
Auburn's football games."
After rejecting both of the state's arguments, the court then com-
mented that "the crime of tampering with a sports contest was obviously
not intended to and does not, embrace the agent contract type of situa-
tion involved in this case."'" In further support of its decision, the court
also cited the trial judge's comment made in response to the defense
counsel's motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's
evidence: "it's obvious to me that these statutes have been stretched to
almost the breaking point in order to try to embrace the Defendant's
conduct within the four corners of these statutes.... And I have some
doubts as to whether any one of these statutes apply [sic]."' 0 The analy-
ses of both the trial judge and the appellate court indicate the express
rejection of imposing criminal liability on a sports agent for this sort of
conduct under the Alabama "tampering" statute.
2. The Alabama Athlete Agents Regulatory Act10 6
By remarkable coincidence, on August 3, 1987, the same day Kevin
Porter signed the contract with Jim Abernethy, the Alabama Athlete
Agents Regulatory Act became effective.10 7 Although the Act was spe-
cifically designed to control and regulate the activities of sports agents
such as Jim Abernethy, the court in Abernethy did not examine the
sports agent's conduct under the Act since the legislation did not provide
100. Id. at 188.
101. Id.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 190.
105. Id.
106. ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-1 to -41 (Supp. 1989).
107. Abernethy, 545 So. 2d at 190.
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for retroactive effect."' 8 However, this legislative attempt clearly signi-
fied another effort by the state of Alabama to regulate and sanction the
conduct of sports agents.
In general, the Act: creates a commission 0 9 to monitor the rules for
mandatory registration of sports agents; 10 requires the posting of ade-
quate surety bond coverage;"' sets out the form and content of the con-
tract to be used by sports agents;'"2 requires the agent to establish a trust
fund when the agent is the recipient of the athlete's salary;1 3 requires
detailed records to be kept by sports agents" 4 and allows for inspection
of these records by the commission;" 5 establishes rules regarding the ad-
vertisement of sports agents' services;" 6 sets limits on agents' fees where
the athlete fails to obtain or be paid for employment;" 7 and, provides
rules of procedure for settling any disputes under the Act."" The most
powerful section of the Act, however, is itspenalty provision which states
that "[a]ny person.., who violates any provision of this chapter shall be
guilty of a Class C felony, punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000.00
or imprisonment for a period of not less than one year nor more than 10
years, or both."" 9 This penalty provision creates a felony violation for
all offenses under the Act, ranging from the failure to properly register1
2 0
to the failure to place in ten-point type on the face of a player-agent
contract a statement that the athlete's amateur standing may be jeopard-
ized by entering the contract.' 2 ' A detailed examination of the Act's
more important provisions is provided in the following section in order
to fully demonstrate its broad implications.
a. mandatory registration of sports agents provisions
The Act provides that "[n]o person shall engage in or carry on the
occupation of an athlete agent either within the state or with a resident of
108. Id. at 191; see ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-1 to -41.
109. ALA. CODE 4 8-26-3.
110. Id. §§ 8-26-4 to -12, -17 to -21, -40.
111. Id. §§ 8-26-14 to -16.
112. Id. §§ 8-26-22 to -24, -39.
113. Id. § 8-26-25.
114. Id. § 8-26-26.
115. Id. § 8-26-27.
116. Id. § 8-26-33.
117. Id. § 8-26-35.
118. Id. §§ 8-26-36 to -38.
119. Id. § 8-26-41 (emphasis added).
120. Id. § 8-26-4.
121. Id. § 8-26-23.
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the state without first registering with the commission." 122 Failure to
comply with the mandatory registration provision not only voids any
contracts negotiated by the agent,1 23 but immediately subjects the agent
to the criminal penalty provision.124 Additionally, the Act requires that
agent applicants, prior to issuance of a registration, provide an affidavit
certifying any formal training or experience in this type of work,1 2 1 post a
surety bond for malpractice coverage, 12 1 and disclose the identity of any-
one having financial interests with the agent. 27 Although these provi-
sions are certainly not unique to Alabama,1 28 they would certainly have a
unique effect on an agent who fails to comply with these provisions. Ala-
bama's serious criminal penalty provision forces agents to continually
conform their conduct to the statute's substantive mandates or otherwise
face stiff criminal penalties.
Section 8-26-7 of the Act allows the Alabama Athlete Agent Regu-
latory Commission (the Commission) to deny registration to an applicant
for athlete agent status for failure to comply with any of the registration
provisions."' This is typical of state registration or licensing regula-
tions.1 30 However, technically, an athlete agent who fails to comply with
any of the numerous registration provisions and acts as an agent is guilty
of a felony under the broad terminology of section 8-26-41, which classi-
fies a violation of "any provision" as a felony.
1 31
Despite its ability to prosecute an athlete agent who fails to comply
with one of the procedural provisions, it may be more likely that the
Commission would simply refuse to register the agent. The practical ef-
fect of the statute's criminal liability provision, however, is that it ap-
pears to force athlete agents in Alabama to register. This factor, coupled
with the other strict requirements of the Act that are designed to ensure
122. Id. § 8-26-4. Section 8-26-2 defines an "athlete agent" as:
Any person who, as an independent contractor, directly or indirectly, recruits or
solicits any athlete to enter into any agent contract or professional sports services
contract, or for a fee procures, offers, promises, or attempts to obtain employment for
any athlete with a professional sports team or as a professional athlete....
Id. § 8-26-2(3).
123. Id. § 8-26-40.
124. Id. § 8-26-41.
125. Id. § 8-26-5(5).
126. Id. §§ 8-26-14 to -16.
127. Id. § 8-26-11.
128. See, eg., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500-1547 (West 1989) (provisions similar to those in
Alabama).
129. ALA. CODE § 8-26-7.
130. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1513 (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-7 (Harrison
Supp. 1989) (both authorizing the state labor commissioner to refuse to grant a registration).
131. ALA. CODE § 8-26-41.
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competent agents of high integrity,132 make the Alabama statute an effec-
tive tool in combatting some of the problems created by sports agents.
b. other important provisions
Beyond its registration requirements, the Act also attempts to regu-
late other aspects of the relationship between the athlete and the sports
agent. To begin with, the Act requires that all contracts used by athlete
agents be on a form approved by the Commission.133 Approval of an
individual agent's contract form is generally granted unless the contract
form appears to be oppressive to the athlete.13 4 More importantly, how-
ever, the Act requires the inclusion of certain information in the con-
tract. Among the most important of these requirements is that the
contract "contain in close proximity to the signature of the athlete a no-
tice in at least 10-point type stating that the athlete may jeopardize his or
her standing as an amateur athlete by entering into the contract."' 135 Ad-
ditionally, the Act contains rules validating the inclusion of any arbitra-
tion agreement in an agent contract. 136 Finally, if the athlete agent is the
recipient of the athlete's salary, the agent is also required to establish a
trust fund in which any payment made to the athlete must be deposited
directly.
137
As with a violation of the registration requirements, an athlete
agent's failure to comply with either the contract or trust fund provisions
immediately exposes the agent to criminal liability under the broad man-
date of section 8-26-41.131 However, unlike the registration provisions,
which are generally procedural requirements, the contract and trust fund
provisions are of a substantive nature. 139 This suggests that a violation of
these provisions may more likely result in criminal prosecution since rev-
ocation of an athlete agent's registration would not completely address
the violation.
132. See id. §§ 8-26-5 to -7.
133. Id. § 8-26-22.
134. Id.
135. Id. § 8-26-23. This notice serves the purpose of informing all athletes of the serious
consequences of signing an agent representation agreement prior to the expiration of their
collegiate eligibility.
136. Id. § 8-26-39.
137. Id. § 8-26-25.
138. Id. § 8-26-41.
139. As a general rule, laws which fix duties and establish rights and responsibilities for
persons are substantive in character, while those which merely prescribe the manner in which
such rights and responsibilities may be exercised are procedural. State v. Gibson Circuit
Court, 239 Ind. 394, 397, 157 N.E.2d 475, 478 (1959).
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c. the likely effect of the Alabama Act on sports agents
like Jim Abernethy
Had the principles of the Alabama Athlete Agents Regulatory Act
been applied in Abernethy, the state could have prosecuted Mr. Aberne-
thy under a statute more directly relevant to agent misconduct than the
tampering with a sports contest statute.14° First, if Abernethy was not a
registered athlete agent when he entered into the contract with Porter, he
would have been in violation of the mandatory registration provision14 1
and technically would have been guilty of a felony under section 8-26-
41.142 Alternatively, if Abernethy had been properly registered, but his
contract with Porter did not contain the required disclosure on the face
of the agreement that Porter "may jeopardize his . . . standing as an
amateur athlete by entering into the contract,"' 143 Abernethy would have
been equally guilty of a felony for his failure to comply with that provi-
sion. Additionally, although the Act does not specifically prohibit or
criminalize the making of a sports contract with a student athlete, the
Act does provide that the Commission may refuse to grant, revoke, or
suspend the registration of any athlete agent applicant who "[h]as en-
gaged in conduct which violates or causes a student athlete to violate any
rule or regulation promulgated by the National Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation governing student athletes and their relationship with athlete-
agents."'" Since Abernethy's contract with Porter clearly was in viola-
tion of the NCAA rules,145 this should have led to suspension or revoca-
tion of Abernethy's registration under this section of the Act or
alternatively, should have been adequate grounds for denying him regis-
tration if he had attempted to apply. To summarize, it appears that
sports agents such as Jim Abernethy would face either criminal prosecu-
tion or censorship of their practice as a result of conduct that violates the
strict provisions of the Alabama Athlete Agents Regulatory Act. 146
d. the problems with Alabama's legislative attempt
Although the Alabama Athlete Agents Regulatory Act represents a
marked improvement in a state legislature's attempt at imposing criminal
liability on sports agents, the Act still possesses many deficiencies. First,
140. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-143.
141. See id § 8-26-4 (Supp. 1989).
142. See id. § 8-26-41.
143. Id. § 8-26-23.
144. Id. § 8-26-7(a)(4).
145. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
146. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-1 to -41.
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the Act does not cover agents who merely provide legal, tax or financial
planning advice or who merely manage an athlete's money.147 By insu-
lating this population of sports agents, the statute provides an easy means
for many sports agents to escape coverage under the statute. Second, the
Act applies only to Alabama-resident agents and to non-resident agents
representing Alabama-resident athletes.14 This jurisdictional limitation
severely restricts both the scope and effectiveness of the statute's other
provisions."' Finally, although the Act requires the inclusion of pre-
scribed language on an agent contract, 50 the Act fails to require agents
to submit contracts to a regulatory body either before or after entering
into the contractual agreement. By failing to monitor these contractual
agreements, Alabama may have opened the door for widespread abuses
by agents of many of the statute's important provisions.1 51
B. A Federal Attempt at Imposing Criminal Sanctions
on Sports Agents
The growth in the number of practicing sports agents has expanded
the problems created by sports agent misconduct well beyond the scope
of state and administrative regulations. This Comment next examines
the "national attempt" at controlling sports agent misconduct by analyz-
ing federal criminal liability as it exists today. After a brief discussion of
the types of agent misconduct that are subject to criminal liability, this
Comment specifically analyzes United States v. Walters.'52 Walters ap-
pears to represent the federal government's first attempt at criminally
prosecuting sports agents for misconduct relating to the recruitment and
representation of athletes. Although the prosecution in Walters was ini-
tially successful, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit recently reversed the agents' convictions based on two procedural
errors committed by the trial court. This Comment highlights the
problems associated with using the existing federal statutes against sports
agents.
147. Sobel, supra note 2, at 741; see ALA. CODE § 8-26-2(3).
148. Sobel, supra note 2, at 747; see ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-3(k), -4.
149. See infra notes 319-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of state jurisdictional
limitations.
150. Sobel, supra note 2, at 763; see ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-22, -23.
151. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-22, -23.
152. 711 F. Supp. 1435 (N.D. Ill. 1989), rev'd, Nos. 89-2352, 89-2353, 89-3285, 89-3286,
slip op. (7th Cir. Sept. 17, 1990).
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1. The types of agents and the types of conduct that are subject to
criminal liability
Sports agents, like other "sophisticated" businessmen, deal in a
complex environment where the pressures to succeed have created an
enormously competitive marketplace luring many to disregard the law.
Many agents are entrusted as financial fiduciaries for their clients, and
they typically handle player money, investments and taxes." 3 In addi-
tion, agent recruitment of athletes requires intense solicitation through
the mails, by telephone and in face-to-face meetings. All of these general
activities typically conducted by most agents1 54 can result in potential
criminal liability.
The types of activities included under "white collar crime" '  have
been expanded to reach much of the work performed by all types of ath-
lete agents. Examples of white collar crimes that typically can affect ath-
lete agents include: embezzlement, extortion, tax evasion, conspiracy,
mail and wire fraud and racketeering. 156 Although this list is not exhaus-
tive, it generally encompasses much of the improper conduct applicable
to athlete agents. A sports agent whose function is limited to negotiating
a player contract is as restricted by criminal statutes as the agent who
provides full accounting and legal services. However, members of the
latter group are more likely to be exposed to more criminal statutes regu-
lating agent activities simply because their activities are more complex
and diverse in nature. For example, an agent who manages his clients'
assets potentially is exposed to embezzlement statutes, whereas an agent
who merely negotiates his clients' contracts is not.
White collar crime, by its very nature, may go undetected. Its viola-
tors often may be educated and possess the necessary business and legal
knowledge to carefully avoid exposure to criminal liability. However,
153. See Sobel, supra note 2, at 708-09.
154. Only very few of the more successful agents have the luxury of not having to actively
solicit clients. Agents in this category are probably not going to be subject to criminal statu-
tory provisions relating to the recruitment of players because in these situations it is the ath-
letes who seek out the agents. Leigh Steinberg is an example of an agent that fits into this
exception to the general category of agents who must actively solicit athlete-clients. O'Connell
& Welling, supra note 27, at 62.
155. A modem working definition of "white collar crime" focuses on the act, not the actor:
"white collar crime" comprises "non-violent crime for financial gain committed by means of
deception by persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional or semi-profes-
sional and utilizing their special skills and opportunities .... ." BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TIcs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DICTIONARY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA TERMINOLOGY 215
(2d ed. 1981).
156. M. PICKHOLZ, S. HORN & J. SIMON, GUIDE TO WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PRACTI-
CAL GUIDE FOR THE CORPORATE COUNSELOR 7-9 (1986).
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enforcement agencies realizing that these problems exist have focused
their investigative efforts skillfully, thereby capturing "new markets" of
white collar criminals."5 7 Recently, two sports agents, Norby Walters
and Lloyd Bloom, were prosecuted under several "white collar" criminal
statutes. 58 Although the trial court's conviction was reversed on appeal,
the trial court's analysis of the federal criminal statutes suggests that
sports agents might be the "newest market" of white collar criminals to
have been tapped. Furthermore, although much of the conduct engaged
in by these two agents is not characteristic of the profession in general, 59
some of the activities for which they were indicted and prosecuted illus-
trate that the "white collar" criminal statutes now clearly extend to the
sports agent profession.
2. An example of specific violations of the federal criminal statutes
through the conduct of sports agents Norby Walters and
Lloyd Bloom in United States v. Walters
The use of federal criminal statutes to prosecute sports agents offers
some hope that the federal government may want to curb agent miscon-
duct. However, for purposes of punishing agent misconduct that is not
as egregious as that of Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom, existing federal
statutes may be inadequate. The following subsections analyze the fed-
eral statutes used to prosecute Walters and Bloom and then discuss the
appellate court's reversal of these prosecutions. This analysis illustrates
the problems inherent in the federal statutes' universal application to
sports agents.
a. the prelude to the indictment
Norby Walters began his professional career, like many other sports
agents, in the entertainment business. 6 ° Walters created Norby Walters
Associates, Inc. (NWA), a booking agency for famous black entertain-
ers. 6 ' Smart and hardworking, Walters built an extremely successful
157. An example of a "new market" is the rise in the number of prosecutions of insider
trading in the 1980's. 128 CONG. REc. 29,531 (1982) (SEC Memorandum in support of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1982 discussing how the SEC has in recent years stepped up
its efforts to protect the securities markets by initiating more insider trading prosecutions).
158. See Walters, 711 F. Supp. 1435.
159. See infra notes 186-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of Walters' and Bloom's
alleged conduct as outlined in the indictment.
160. Neff, Agents of Turmoil, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 3, 1987, at 36 [hereinafter Neff,
Agents of Turmoil].
161. Id. Some of Walters' clients included Miles Davis, Luther Vandross, Patti LaBelle,
Janet Jackson, Kool and the Gang, and Ben Vereen. Id.
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business.16 2 Lloyd Bloom worked as a bouncer, a professional party-
giver and a debt collector at his father's agency.163
In early 1985, Bloom approached Walters and suggested that they
team up to recruit and represent college athletes.' Bloom's plan was
simple: he would use his sports knowledge to recruit athletes and Wal-
ters would use his skills as a booking agent to complete the deal. 6 '
Walters and Bloom organized World Sports & Entertainment, Inc.
(WSE), as a corporation to recruit and represent college athletes.1 66 Af-
ter athletes had entered into representation agreements with WSE, Wal-
ters and Bloom would negotiate the athletes' professional contracts.1
6
1
Walters and Bloom targeted the market of poor, black athletes with
needy families. 161 Through phone calls, written solicitations and face-to-
face meetings, Walters and Bloom were able to use their persuasiveness
and cultural knowledge to formulate and deliver a "high-velocity sales
pitch."' 169 According to the indictment,' the agents' standard sales
pitch was an offer of between $2,500 and $5,000 up front, with monthly
payments thereafter of $250 in return for a signed exclusive representa-
tion contract.' 7 ' The sales pitch proved effective, as WSE signed at least
thirty -athletes, including some of the biggest names in college sports.'
72
After the flash and glitter of Walters' and Bloom's presentation
wore off, many WSE athletes became disenchanted with the two
agents.'1 3 Complaints of broken promises 74 and a general dissatisfac-
tion with WSE's management of players' careers, started the chain of
events that eventually toppled Walters and Bloom.'




166. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1437.
167. See Neff, Agents of Turmoil, supra note 160, at 39.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 37. National Football League wide receiver Tim McGee said, "He had the
speech patterns down.... He talked like the black guys on the corer.... ." Id.
170. See infra notes 186-97 and accompanying text.
171. Selcraig, The Deal Went Sour, SpoRTs ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 5, 1988, at 32.
172. Neff, Agents of Turmoil, supra note 160, at 34. Some clients of Walters and Bloom
included National Football League players Tim McGee, Doug Dubose, Reggie Rogers, Rod
Woodson, Tony Woods, Terrence Flagler, Chris Carter, Ronnie Harmon, Paul Palmer and
John Clay. Selcraig, supra note 171, at 34-38.
173. Neff, Agents of Turmoil, supra note 160, at 40.
174. Walters often used his booking agent business to lure young black athletes by promis-
ing to introduce them to famous entertainers and celebrities. Selcraig, supra note 171, at 34-
38.
175. See Neff, Agents of Turmoil, supra note 160, at 40.
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Some of WSE's dissatisfied signees defected to other agents. 176 Wal-
ters reacted by suing the athletes and speaking out against them in the
press. 177 Walters' actions publicized the inner dealings of WSE and, in
effect, brought WSE under tremendous scrutiny from other clients, other
agents, and the legal authorities.
178
Interestingly, at this same time, Kathy Clements, an associate of
sports agent Steve Zucker, was slashed and beaten by an unidentified
attacker in her Chicago office. 179 Zucker and Clements had signed three
defectees from WSE and claimed that Walters and Bloom had upbraided
them over the phone for doing so.' 8 ° Although no solid evidence was
ever found linking Walters or WSE to the Clements' attack, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was suspicious of the possible connec-
tion.'81 The FBI was also concerned about other reports linking Walters
and Bloom to illegal activities, and as a result, opened an investigation in
May of 1987.182 A federal grand jury inquiry accompanied this investi-
gation into Walters' and Bloom's work as sports agents. 18 3 After a sev-
enteen-month FBI investigation in which dozens of college and
professional players and several college administrators testified, 184 the
federal grand jury issued an indictment on August 24, 1988 against
Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom in connection with their signing of
forty-four athletes to professional contracts before their college eligibility
had expired.' 85
b. the indictment
In a seven-count indictment,8 6 Walters and Bloom generally were
accused of dealing with a reputed organized-crime figure, cheating one
athlete out of his signing bonus, and threatening at least four clients with
176. Id.
177. Id. at 42.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 34.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 35. The Clements attack was not mentioned in the federal grand jury indict-
ment. Selcraig, supra note 171, at 33.
182. Neff, Agents of Turmoil, supra note 160, at 35.
183. Id.
184. See id.; Selcraig, supra note 171, at 32.
185. Selcraig, supra note 171, at 32.
186. The original indictment containing eight counts was superseded by a seven-count in-
dictment filed February 1, 1989. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1438 n.2. The superseding indict-
ment added the allegations concerning concealment from the Grand Jury. Id. It changed
slightly the property allegations of the mail fraud charges. Id. It also dropped one of the mail
fraud counts alleging a scheme to defraud the University of Illinois. Id. Finally, it altered
somewhat the factual allegations underlying several counts. Id.
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violence if they attempted to break their contracts with WSE. I 7 The
contracts provided Walters and Bloom with exclusive rights to represent
the players when they "turned pro" ' and often gave Walters and
Bloom a power of attorney. 1 9 These contracts were routinely postdated
so as to make it appear that they were properly signed after the players
had completed their last year of collegiate eligibility.
1 90
Specifically, the indictment listed among others the following
charges: Count One of the indictment charged Walters and Bloom with
conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO);191 Count Two of the indictment charged Walters and
Bloom with the substantive offense of mail fraud;192 Counts Three
through Five alleged similar mail frauds victimizing Michigan State Uni-
versity, the University of Iowa and Purdue University respectively; 193
Count Six charged a "conventional" conspiracy;194 and, Count Seven of
the indictment charged Walters and Bloom with the substantive violation
of section 1962(c) for conducting the affairs of NWA and WSE through a
pattern of racketeering activity as outlined in Count One.1 95
Prior to the start of their jury trial, Walters and Bloom filed motions
to dismiss the indictment on numerous grounds.1 96 The underlying
187. Selcraig, supra note 171, at 32. The indictment specifically alleged that Walters and
Bloom offered players clothing, concert and airline tickets, automobiles, cash, interest-free
loans, hotel accommodations, use of limousines, insurance policies, trips to entertainment
events, introductions to celebrities, and cash to their families in exchange for the athletes'
signatures on contracts. Id.
188. Id.
189. Neff, Agents of Turmoil, supra note 160, at 40.
190. Id.
191. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). Section 1962(d) prohibits a conspiracy to engage in
any of RICO's prohibited activities. Id. § 1962(d). In this count, Walters and Bloom were
accused of conspiring to violate RICO section 1962(c) by conducting and participating in the
conduct of the affairs of NWA and WSE through a pattern of racketeering activity consisting
of multiple acts of: extortion, collection of extensions of credit by extortionate means, mail
fraud, wire fraud and the use of interstate facilities in furtherance of unlawful activity. Wal-
ters, 711 F. Supp. at 1438.
192. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1438. The basis of the charge was the defrauding of the
University of Michigan, which awarded scholarships to two football players based on false
player eligibility documents mailed by Walters and Bloom. Id. Walters and Bloom were al-
leged to have improperly completed and mailed these forms and to have instructed their clients
to do the same. Id
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1439; see 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988). Walters and Bloom were accused of agreeing
to collect debts by extortionate means, to commit mail and wire fraud and to conceal informa-
tion from the Grand Jury. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1439.
195. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1439.
196. Id. at 1437. Although Walters and Bloom submitted separate motions and briefs, each
indicated that they wished to join in the other's motions. Id. at 1439 n.2.
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theme of these motions attempted to distinguish sports agents from tradi-
tional offenders of the federal statutes. 19 7 Analyzing the theories adopted
by the court in denying these pre-trial motions will aid in understanding
the applicability of the federal criminal statutes to sports agents in gen-
eral. The following analysis also illustrates that because much of Wal-
ters' and Bloom's conduct was egregious in nature, many of the criminal
statutes under which they were prosecuted (and the court's interpreta-
tions thereof) may be inapplicable to the general practices of the major-
ity of agents today. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit's subsequent
reversal of the trial court's conviction along with the analysis of the trial
court's decision highlights the further problems in the current statutory
scheme and illustrates the need for federal criminal statutes tailored to
sports agents.
c. an analysis of sports agents and the federal criminal statutes
1. RICO racketeering violations under section 1962(c)
In Count Seven of the federal grand jury indictment, Walters and
Bloom were charged with the substantive violation of RICO for con-
ducting the affairs of NWA and WSE through a pattern of racketeering
activity.1 98 The relevant section of RICO provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, di-
rectly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of un-
lawful debt.1 99
The two main elements, therefore, of a section 1962(c) violation are (1)
an "enterprise," as defined by the statute, and (2) apattern of racketeer-
ing activity.2 °°
In attacking the RICO charge, Bloom201 asserted that WSE was not
an "enterprise" under section 1962(c). 2 2 In rejecting this argument, the
197. See id. at 1437.
198. Id. at 1439.
199. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
200. Id. § 1961(4), (5).
201. Although most of the challenges to the indictment were presented jointly by Waiters
and Bloom, the challenge of WSE as an enterprise under section 1962(c) was made solely by
Bloom. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1439 n.3, 1448. For purposes of this Comment, all references
will be made to the two acting together in their arguments.
202. Id. at 1448; see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Bloom presented this same argument in challeng-
ing Count One of the indictment, conspiracy to violate RICO section 1962(c). Walters, 711 F.
Supp. at 1448. Bloom also argued that he was prejudiced by the improper enterprise allegation
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district court initially focused on the statutory definition of an "enter-
prise."2 3 Section 1961(4) of RICO defines an enterprise as "any individ-
ual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal en-
tity .... ,,204 In United States v. Neapolitan,215 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit found that the central element to an enterprise was
its "structure. '2 6 Although no absolute definition of "structure" exists,
to prove a RICO "enterprise" under section 1962(c), according to the
United States Supreme Court, "structure" may be evidenced by an
"ongoing organization, formal or informal, [which exists for] a common
purpose of engaging in a course of conduct [and whose] various associ-
ates function as a continuing unit. ' 2 7 This requirement of "structure"
in a RICO enterprise necessitates more than a mere "group of people
who get together to commit a 'pattern of racketeering activity.' ")208
Conversely, when an enterprise is a legal entity, this "structure" is
easy to find.20 9 In United States v. Anderson,21° the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit held that Congress intended that "a group of individu-
als associated in fact although not a legal entity" can constitute a RICO
enterprise under section 1962(c), as long as it sufficiently possesses an
"ascertainable structure."2"' These distinctions illustrate the central role
of the concept of "enterprise" under RICO: "the criminal infiltration
and manipulation of organizational structures.1212 Further, in Anderson,
the court noted that Congress intended for RICO to also apply to groups
which, though not "legal" entities, possess "an ascertainable structure
which exists for the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward
an economic goal."
'2 13
Relying on the statutory definition of "enterprise" and the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits' interpretations thereof, the Walters court held that
because the enterprise tied him to the organized crime activities of Norby Walters Associates
during the period of 1981 to 1984, prior to the time Bloom joined WSE. Id. at 1448-49. The
court dismissed this argument. Id.
203. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1448.
204. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
205. 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1986).
206. Id. at 500.
207. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
208. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 500.
209. Id. at 499. Section 1961(4) of RICO includes "legal entities" in its deiinition of "enter-
prise." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
210. 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
211. Id. at 1372.
212. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 500.
213. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1372.
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the government had adequately pled a RICO enterprise.214 The court
noted that WSE had no separate existence apart from NWA, which was a
legal corporation.215 As a legal entity, the "structure" requirement for a
RICO enterprise was met, and accordingly both NWA and WSE were
subject to section 1962(c). 216 Even if Walters' and Bloom's operation
had not been classified as a legal entity, their "group" should have, in all
likelihood, possessed the ascertainable "structure" necessary for a RICO
"enterprise." The operations of Walters and Bloom through WSE were
directed toward an economic goal of profiting through the representation
of professional athletes.217 Additionally, the systematic program
through which they recruited and represented athletes further evidenced
the "structure" of a RICO "enterprise." Thus, under either of the theo-
ries available, the government adequately proved a RICO enterprise.
Under RICO, once the existence of an "enterprise" has been estab-
lished, the final step in the prosecution of a section 1962(c) violation is to
show that the enterprise conducted its affairs through a "pattern of rack-
eteering activity. '218 "Racketeering activity" is broadly defined to in-
elude activities ranging from violent offenses chargeable under state law
to most acts indictable under title 18 of the United States Code. 219 A
pattern of racketeering activity under section 1962(c) requires two or
more of these acts. 220 This broad definition of racketeering has the prac-
tical effect of enlarging the section's scope to include everyday business
activities which involve a "bending of the rules."' 221 For example, by
mailing, on more than one occasion, documents containing incorrect eli-
gibility information (two acts of mail fraud),222 Walters and Bloom
would have technically conducted WSE's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity in violation of section 1962(c).223
While two acts of mail fraud may technically suffice to complete a
RICO violation, the United States Supreme Court in Sedima S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co.224 stated that RICO requires "continuity plus [a] relationship
214. Waiters, 711 F. Supp. at 1448.
215. Id.
216. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
217. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
218. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
219. See id § 1961(1).
220. Id. § 1961(5); see id. § 1962(c).
221. M. PICKHOLZ, S. HoRN & J. SIMON, supra note 156, at 132; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
222. For a discussion of the mail fraud violations, see infra notes 246-74 and accompanying
text.
223. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
224. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
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... to produce a pattern." 2 25 It is, therefore, doubtful that only two acts
of mail fraud by a sports agent in furtherance of one scheme to defraud
sufficiently demonstrates "continuity" as required under Sedima. How-
ever, the above example, illustrates that a sports agent's activities may fit
the broad definition of a RICO enterprise and further misconduct may
result in a technical violation of section 1962(c). 226
2. Extortion violations under section 1951 of the Hobbs Act
Counts One and Seven of the federal Grand Jury indictment also
alleged, in part, that Walters and Bloom committed extortion in violation
of section 1951 of the Hobbs Act (the Hobbs Act)227 by "threatening
three student-athletes with physical harm, and one student-athlete with
harm to his reputation, if they did not honor their representation agree-
ments with WSE. '228 The Hobbs Act provides, in pertinent part that:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects com-
merce or the movement of any article or commodity in com-
merce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires to do
so, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or
property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in
violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.22 9
Bloom and Walters argued that the indictment failed to state an offense
under the Hobbs Act for two reasons. First, the indictment did not al-
lege the wrongful use of actual or threatened force (a "claim-of-right"
defense).230 Second, the indictment failed to allege an effect on interstate
commerce.
23 1
Under the claim-of-right defense, Walters and Bloom contended
that they had a legitimate claim to the representation agreements with
the student-athletes, and therefore, their threats of force to retain this
"property" could not be in violation of the Hobbs Act.232 This defense
had previously been recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
225. Id. at 496 n.14.
226. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
227. See id § 1951.
228. Waiters, 711 F. Supp. at 1449.
229. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
230. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1449. Under the claim of right defense, the person seeking to
obtain the property claims a legal interest in it, and therefore the attempt to regain control of
this property is asserted as not being in violation of the law. See United States v. Enmons, 410
U.S. 396, 399-400 (1973).
231. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1449.
232. Id.
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United States v. Enmons,233 a case involving a labor dispute in which
officials of labor unions used violence to obtain higher wages and other
employment benefits for striking employees.234 In Enmons, the Court
relied on the legislative history of the Hobbs Act, which clearly indicated
that Congress did not intend for the Act to apply to labor disputes.
Every circuit court after Enmons has limited the claim-of-right defense to
situations where there is a clear congressional intent that the Hobbs Act
not apply.235 As Congress did not express an intent to exclude athlete
representation contracts or similar property from liability under the
Hobbs Act, it follows that any use of actual or threatened force to regain
such property will not be excluded from the statute. Accordingly, the
district court in Walters rejected Walters' and Bloom's claim-of-right de-
fense stating that there was "no clear congressional intent that the Hobbs
Act [should] not apply." '236
Bloom and Walters also argued that the indictment failed "to estab-
lish that [any] alleged extortionate activity affected or interfered with in-
terstate commerce. ' 237 In rejecting this defense, the district court cited a
Seventh Circuit opinion, United States v. Anderson,238 for the proposition
that the Hobbs Act extends to the limits of the commerce clause239 and
thus "reaches conduct where the effect on interstate commerce is slight
and where there is no actual effect proved but there is a realistic
probability of an effect." 2'
Walters and Bloom had allegedly used threats to enforce contracts
made with student-athletes at major universities and in professional
sports leagues.241 Additionally, college and professional players and
teams travel in interstate commerce; therefore, they could have an effect
on interstate commerce in a variety of ways.242 Furthermore, the com-
233. 410 U.S. 396 (1973).
234. Id. at 398.
235. Waiters, 711 F. Supp. at 1449. Enmons represents the only current case where the
clear congressional intent specifically mandated that the Hobbs Act not apply. See S. REp.
No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1981).
236. Waiters, 711 F. Supp. at 1449.
237. Id. The Hobbs Act applies to conduct that "in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or
affects [interstate] commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in [interstate] com-
merce. .. ." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Therefore, if Bloom's and Walters' defense were successful,
their conduct would be outside the purview of the statute.
238. 809 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1987).
239. Id. at 1286.
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. Waiters, 711 F. Supp. at 1438.
242. Id. at 1450. For example, these teams stimulate a large amount of business in the
communities where the teams participate. Generally, this business involves goods such as food
and sports merchandise that travel through interstate commerce. See Becketts, How the A's
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missions that Walters and Bloom would have been paid from these play-
ers would have been paid in part from teams which operate across state
lines.243 Applying this reasoning, the district court had no difficulty in
establishing that Walters' and Bloom's activities had the necessary mini-
mum effect on interstate commerce under the Hobbs Act.2'
Because almost all professional sports involve interstate competi-
tion, under the Walters court's rationale, an agent contracting with a
student or professional athlete is engaging in activity that affects inter-
state commerce.245 Additionally, since a claim-of-right defense does not
protect sports agents, from the courts' analysis in Walters, it appears that
sports agents who are found to have made improper threats are subject to
criminal liability under the Hobbs Act.
3. Mail fraud violations under section 1341246
Counts Two through Five of the federal Grand Jury indictment al-
leged that Walters and Bloom defrauded four universities2 47 of money
and property by causing to be mailed and mailing false eligibility infor-
mation upon which certain student-athletes were awarded scholar-
ships.2 48 The United States Supreme Court has held that the two
elements of the federal offense of mail fraud are: (1) a scheme to defraud
victims of money or property, and (2) the mailing of a letter, etc., for the
purpose of executing the scheme.249 In further defining these elements,
the Court has held that it is not necessary that the scheme contemplate
the use of the mails as an essential element of mail fraud.25 ' Addition-
ally, to sustain a conviction for mail fraud, it need not be shown that the
Use Show B& to Pack'em In, S.F. Chronicle, August 20, 1990, at Cl, col. 2 (discussing the
Oakland A's numerous business ventures in the Bay Area).
243. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1450.
244. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
245. See Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1449-50.
246. The relevant language of the mail fraud statute is identical to the federal wire fraud
statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988). This discussion of the mail fraud allegations applies with
equal force to the wire fraud allegations.
247. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1438. The four universities were the University of Michigan,
Michigan State University, Purdue University and the University of Iowa. Id.
248. Id.
249. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); see also United States v. Maze, 414 U.S.
395 (1974); United States v. Goldberg, 455 F.2d 479, 480 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 967
(1972); Hidkman v. United States, 406 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 960
(1969); Milam v. United States, 322 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 736
(1964); Blue v. United States, 138 F.2d 351, 358-59 (6th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 911
(1944); Alexander v. United States, 95 F.2d 873, 877 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 637
(1938); United States v. Sheiner, 273 F. Supp. 977, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 410 F.2d 337,
341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825 (1969).
250. Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8.
[Vol. 24:273
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF SPORTS AGENTS 303
scheme was successful or that the victims actually relied upon false rep-
resentations.25 ' In short, the statute does not require the government to
prove that anyone, in fact, was defrauded. 52 Rather, to sustain a convic-
tion under the mail fraud statute, the government need only prove that
some actual harm or injury was contemplated by the scheme.
25 3
The first element of mail fraud requires a scheme to defraud victims
of money or property. 54 Walters and Bloom sought dismissal of the sub-
stantive mail fraud counts for failure of the government to satisfy this
element under what is commonly referred to as a "McNally" argu-
ment. 5 Walters and Bloom alleged that McNally v. United States 56
restricted the scope of the mail fraud statute to schemes which defraud
victims of money or property, and that the universities were not de-
frauded of money or property.25 7
McNally involved a self-dealing patronage scheme by de facto state
officials who allegedly defrauded the citizens and state of Kentucky of
certain intangible rights, such as the right to have the commonwealth's
affairs conducted honestly. 5 ' The Supreme Court held that the victims
were not deprived of "money or property" by this scheme because the
right to an honest government is an "intangible right" which is not pro-
tected by the mail fraud statute.259
Intangible rights, however, are not automatically excluded from
protection by the mail fraud statute. The "money and property" distinc-
tion raised in McNally was clarified in Carpenter v. United States,260
which involved a scheme to appropriate confidential news information
from the Wall Street Journal.261 In Carpenter, the Supreme Court ruled
that this confidential information was property, stating that "its intangi-
ble nature does not make it any less 'property' protected by the mail and
wire fraud statutes [and that] McNally did not limit the scope of [section]
251. United States v. Jackson, 451 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 928
(1972). It is not even essential that the victim of the scheme be deceived as long as there is
evidence of a scheme or artifice to deceive. Id.
252. United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423, 431 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1001 (1967).
253. See United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
915 (1982); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1399 n.11 (2d Cir. 1976).
254. Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8.
255. Waiters, 711 F. Supp. at 1442.
256. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
257. Waiters, 711 F. Supp. at 1443.
258. McNally, 483 U.S. at 361 n.9.
259. Id.
260. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
261. Id. at 22-24.
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1341 to tangible as distinguished from intangible property rights." '2 6 2
In Walters, the government alleged that Walters and Bloom de-
frauded the universities of two types of property: (1) money and prop-
erty in the form of tuition, room, board, fees and other financial
assistance provided to student-athletes based on the false certifications;
and (2) the universities' right to control allocation of their limited
number of athletic scholarships.263 The Walters court found that the first
part of the indictment did not conflict with McNally and that the defend-
ants had violated the Hobbs Act since the property deprivation consisted
of tangible property and money.2 4 The court further rejected Walters'
argument that the universities were not defrauded of money or property
because they suffered no economic loss based on the Supreme Courts'
holding in Carpenter, that a victim need not suffer economic or monetary
loss in order to be defrauded under the statute.265
The second type of alleged property deprivation, the universities'
right to control allocation of their limited number of athletic scholar-
ships, posed a different problem. The difficulty in distinguishing between
tangible property such as the scholarships and intangible property, such
as the right to control the allocation of the scholarships has been dis-
cussed in the common-law definition of property:
The word "property," in law, is not the material object itself,
but it is the right and interest or domination which is rightfully
and lawfully obtained over the material object, with the un-
restricted right to its use, enjoyment and disposition, either lim-
ited or unlimited in duration.2 "
Based on this definition, the Walters court concluded that the second
alleged property right, the "right to control," merged with the first bun-
dle of alleged property rights, scholarship money, room and board, etc.,
to represent but "one property right." '267 Additionally, the court pointed
out that the intangible property right to control disposition of property is
protected by the mail fraud statute under the Supreme Court's opinion in
262. Id. at 25.
263. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1443.
264. Id. at 1444; see 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
265. Id. The premise that a mail fraud victim must suffer economic or monetary loss in
order to be defrauded has been rejected by other courts as well. See, e.g., United States v.
Thomas, 686 F. Supp. 1078 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 866 F.2d 1413 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S.Ct. 1958 (1989); United States v. Cooper, 677 F. Supp. 778 (D. Del. 1988).
266. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1445.
267. Id. Note that the overlap between the two alleged property deprivations in the indict-
ment did not prejudice Walters and Bloom, and, therefore, was not fatal to the validity of the
indictment. Id.
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Carpenter.268
In summary, Walters demonstrates that conduct by sports agents
similar to that of Walters and Bloom, whereby an agent misrepresents
material facts about a student-athlete's eligibility status, is sufficient to
maintain a prosecution under the mail fraud statute. Moreover, a
scheme to defraud the victim of money or property need not result in the
university actually losing money. It is sufficient that the scheme contem-
plate such a result.
The second element of mail fraud requires the mailing of a letter for
the purpose of executing the scheme. 269 A perpetrator need not actually
place an item in the mail,27° rather one must either cause the mails to be
used or reasonably foresee that the mails would be used in furtherance of
the scheme.2 71 Walters and Bloom did not dispute this element in their
motion to dismiss the indictment, 7 2 and, generally, it appears that prose-
cutors have had little difficulty in establishing a "mailing" for purposes of
satisfying this element.273
The district court's analysis of the mail fraud statute in Walters indi-
cates that it will impose criminal liability on a sports agent who attempts
to represent a student-athlete prior to the expiration of his college eligi-
bility. Under the analysis, such an agent would be in violation of the
mail fraud statute if he "uses the mails" to submit false eligibility certifi-
cations to the student-athlete's school.
27 4
268. Id.; see also Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26 (intangible property right in keeping confidential
news stories); United States v. Lytle, 677 F. Supp. 1370, 1381 (N.D. II. 1988) (employer's
intangible property right to its employee's faithful services).
269. Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8.
270. United States v. MacKay, 491 F.2d 616, 619 (10th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 416 U.S.
972 (1974).
271. See Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9; United States v. Moss, 591 F.2d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Conte, 349 F.2d 304, 306 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965). Indi-
rect proof of a defendant "having caused" a mailing is acceptable. See United States v. Joyce,
499 F.2d 9, 15-16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1974). Where, for example, there is
testimony about customary office procedure, there is no need to identify and to elicit testimony
from the person who actually put the envelope in the mails. Id.
272. See Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1442-46.
273. See, eg., Pereira, 347 U.S. at 7-8 (defendant's delivery of cheek to his bank was suffi-
cient to establish subsequent foreseeable mailing); Moss, 591 F.2d at 36-37 (defendant caused
mailing under the statute even though the mailing emanated from non-defendant).
274. Note that Walters alleged a due process claim by asserting that the court's "novel and
unprecedented" interpretation of the mail fraud statute failed to put him on notice that his
conduct might be criminal. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1446. The court dismissed this claim by
finding that the fraudulent nature of Walters' transactions with the student-athletes was suffi-
ciently clear to have afforded him notice. Id. This opinion may serve as notice to agents who
contemplate such conduct in the future.
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4. Conspiracy violations under sections 1962(d) and 371
Counts One and Six of the federal grand jury indictment charged
Walters and Bloom with a RICO and conventional criminal conspiracy,
respectively.27 Criminal conspiracy is defined as an agreement between
two or more persons formed for the purpose of committing an unlawful
act or accomplishing a lawful act through unlawful means.276 The requi-
site elements necessary to establish a conspiracy differ depending upon
the underlying act. While all conspiracy statutes require an agreement
77
and a specific intent to achieve a certain objective,2 78 for example, the
unlawful act or the lawful act by unlawful means, some conspiracy stat-
utes require the additional element of an overt act.279 The inherent
vagueness in the definition of criminal conspiracy and the difficulty that
exists in distinguishing its different elements have prompted many com-
mentators to characterize the crime of conspiracy as giving prosecutors a
unique weapon in their arsenal.280 These problems were illustrated class-
ically in Walters' and Bloom's motion to dismiss the two conspiracy
charges in their indictment.281
275. Id. at 1438-39.
276. See United States v. Caplan, 633 F.2d 534, 542 (9th Cir. 1980).
277. See Goldstein, Jr., The Krulewitch Warning: Guilt by Association, 54 GEo. L.J. 133,
135 (1965). The unlawful agreement has often been characterized as the "gist" of the offense
of conspiracy. Toliver v. United States, 224 F.2d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 1955). No formal agree-
ment is necessary to constitute a conspiracy; such agreement may be inferred from facts ap-
pearing in evidence. United States v. Cudia, 346 F.2d 227, 229-30 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 955 (1965).
278. See Goldstein, Jr., supra note 277, at 135. To establish the element of intent, the ac-
cused must be shown to have knowledge of the purpose of the conspiracy. Direct Sales Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943). Additionally, "'conspiracy to commit a particular
substantive offense [(e.g., mail fraud)] cannot exist without at least the degree of criminal in-
tent necessary for the substantive intent itself.'" Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678
(1959) (quoting Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REV. 920,
939 (1959). Note that the conspiracy to commit the substantive offense and the substantive
offense itself are separate and distinct offenses, and that proof of one is not necessarily proof of
the other. Carter v. United States, 333 F.2d 354, 356 (10th Cir. 1964).
279. Generally, an overt act is defined as some step taken by one of the conspirators in
furtherance of the conspiracy. See Goldstein, Jr., supra note 277, at 135; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
371 (1988); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003(A) (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE § 184 (West
1988). It is not necessary that the overt act be completed, but only that some step, even very
slight, be taken towards furthering the conspiracy. Note, Develbpments in the Law-Criminal
Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920, 946 (1959). The function of the overt act is to show that
agreeing or conspiring has progressed from field of thought and talk into action. Hoffman v.
Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 295 (9th Cir. 1959). But see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (no overt act
required).
280. See, eg., Goldstein, supra note 277, at 135; Klein, Conspiracy-The Prosecutor's Dar-
ling, 24 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 1, 3 (1957); Note, Mass Demonstrations and Criminal Conspira-
cies, 16 HASTINGS L. 465, 467-68 (1965).
281. See Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1447.
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Bloom and Walters sought dismissal of the two conspiracy counts282
on the grounds that each count constituted multiple conspiracies.28 3
With respect to the RICO conspiracy charge, the district court rejected
the defendants' argument that they were being charged improperly with
multiple conspiracies, 2 4 by relying on the Seventh Circuit's treatment of
multiple conspiracies in United States v. Neapolitan.285  The Walters
court held that as long as the government alleges that the defendants
entered into a single agreement to violate RICO then the indictment
states a proper section 1962(d) charge of conspiracy.286 Although this
ruling validated the RICO conspiracy charge in the indictment against
Walters and Bloom, it apparently was predicated on a factual and legal
determination that a single agreement existed. The finding of a "single
agreement" is not difficult in a RICO conspiracy because it has been de-
termined that the concept of enterprise 87 links a number of otherwise
distinct crimes and/or conspiracies into one proceeding.288 However in a
conventional conspiracy charge, proving a single agreement is a more
difficult and factually intensive inquiry.2 89
The indictment also alleged a conventional conspiracy290 by Walters
and Bloom to commit several crimes in connection with their representa-
tion of student-athletes.291 With respect to the second conspiracy charge,
the court dismissed the defendants' contention that this count improp-
282. 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1962(d) (1988).
283. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1447-48. The counts accused Walters and Bloom of conspir-
ing to: collect debts through extortionate means; commit mail and wire fraud; conceal infor-
mation from the grand jury; and, violate section 1962(c). Id. at 1438-39. Under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, two or more offenses can be charged in the same indictment, but
each offense must be charged in a separate count. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a). Charging several
conspiracies in the same count violates this rule and can often be fatal to an indictment. See
Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1447.
284. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1447.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1447.
287. See supra notes 202-17 and accompanying text for a discussion . of a RICO
"enterprise."
288. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 501.
289. See United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311, 1332 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that a single
agreement is "often a difficult element to prove because a conspiracy's essential characteristics
are secrecy and concealment .. "). Recognizing this difficulty in proving a single agreement,
the Seventh Circuit has held that direct evidence of the agreement is not required and that the
agreement can be inferred from the circumstances. United States v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600,
607 (7th Cir. 1985).
290. 18 U.S.C. § 371.
291. Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1447. "The specific crimes are the mail and wire fraud vic-
timizing the universities, the collection of debts by extortionate means victimizing the student-
athletes, the mail and wire fraud victimizing one particular athlete, Paul Palmer, and the con-
cealment of information from the grand jury." Id.
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erly alleged multiple conspiracies.2 9 2 The court cited United States v.
Napue,293 which defined the difference between single and multiple con-
spiracies as follows:
Separate conspiracies exist when each of the conspirators'
agreements has its own end, and each transaction constitutes an
end itself. If, on the other hand, the agreements between the
conspirators represent stages or different functions to be per-
formed in the formulation of a larger scheme, the object of
which is to effectuate a single unlawful result, then there is a
single conspiracy .... 294
Applying this test, the district court in Walters felt that, based on
the facts alleged, the separate crimes conceivably could be part of a larger
scheme by Walters and Bloom to act as business agents for college foot-
ball players.2 95 Furthermore, as one court has stated, "there may be a
single conspiracy even though the commission of two or more offenses is
contemplated." '296
In Walters, the government successfully alleged two conspiracies for
purposes of the indictment. Although prosecutors are generally also suc-
cessful in proving the elements of a conspiracy charge at trial, problems
of proof sometimes exist as a result of the vague definition and the impre-
cise nature of the crime itself.2 97 Given the unique nature of sports
agents' activities, a conspiracy charge against a sports agent should gen-
erally require an especially careful analysis of the facts and a proper ap-
plication of the law in order to maintain an effective prosecution.
d. the conviction and reversal
Upon completion of a month long trial and a week of deliberation,
on April 13, 1989, a jury found Walters and Bloom guilty on five of the
seven indictment counts.29 On June 19, 1989, Judge George M.
Marovich sentenced Walters to five years in custody to be followed by
five years of probation and Bloom to a three-year sentence to be followed
292. Id. at 1448.
293. Id. at 1447-48; United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1987).
294. Napue, 834 F.2d at 1332 (citations omitted).
295. Waiters, 711 F. Supp. at 1448.
296. United States v. Bruun, 809 F.2d 397, 406 (7th Cir. 1987).
297. See Goldstein, Jr., supra note 277, at 136.
298. United States v. Walters, Nos. 89-2352, 89-2353, 89-3285, 89-3286, slip op. at 4 (7th
Cir. Sept. 17, 1990). The jury acquitted Walters and Bloom of the mail fraud charges involv-
ing the University of Iowa and Michigan State University as outlined in counts III and V of
the indictment. Id.
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by five years of probation.2 99 Walters and Bloom immediately appealed
their conviction contending several errors were committed during their
trial that should render these convictions invalid.3 O°
On September 17, 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed Walters' and Bloom's convictions and re-
manded with instructions for new trials.3"' Without addressing any of
the substantive counts under which Walters and Bloom were convicted,
the appellate court cited two procedural errors committed by the trial
court that were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a reversal: (1) the re-
fusal of the court to instruct the jury that Walters' actions may have been
predicated on the advice of counsel,302 and (2) the court's denial of
Bloom's motion to sever his trial from Walters'.303 The Seventh Circuit's
reversal of Walters' and Bloom's convictions once again illustrates the
need for a comprehensive federal statute tailored to address the conduct
of sports agents. Without such legislation, the Seventh Circuit opinion in
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id Although the appellate court left open the possibility of a retrial, prosecutors
might determine a retrial to be too costly and complex. Mortensen, Conviction of Walters,
Bloom is overturned, The Nat'l Sports Daily, Sept. 18, 1990, at 12, col. 1. A retrial also seems
unlikely since the two lead prosecutors, U.S. Attorney Anton Valukas and Assistant U.S. At-
torney Howard M. Pearl, are now in private practice. Id Additionally, Pearl now works with
Dan K. Webb, the attorney who defended Bloom, thereby presenting further problems with a
possible retrial. Id
302. Walters, Nos. 89-2352, 89-2353, 89-3285, 89-3286, slip op. at 5-6. On appeal, Walters
argued that because he discussed with his attorneys the potential legal ramifications of entering
into representation agreements with collegiate athletes prior to contracting with these athletes,
his actions were taken in good faith upon the advice of his attorneys, and therefore, he did not
form the specific intent necessary to commit fraud upon the universities. Id at 5. The Seventh
Circuit held that since Walters had presented sufficient evidence on which to support his the-
ory of defense, he deserved a jury instruction explaining this theory. Id. at 6. The court
further held that the trial court's failure to provide a jury instruction on Walters' theory of
defense infected the fairness of his trial. Id. As a result, Waiters' conviction was reversed and
his case was remanded so as to provide him such an opportunity. Id.
303. Id at 7-9. At his trial, Bloom argued that Waiters' pursuit of an advice-of-counsel
defense forced him to waive his attorney-client privilege. Id. at 7. He, therefore, requested
that the trial court sever his trial from that of Walters'. Id. On appeal, Bloom contended that
the trial court's denial of his motion to sever his trial was reversible error. Id.
The Seventh Circuit found that Bloom was acting as an individual when he sought the
advice of his attorneys, not as an officer of WSE. Id at 8. Therefore, the court held that
Bloom was protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. The court further held that since
Bloom was forced to observe his attorneys testify at trial about the intimate discussions to
which he had been a party, and in so doing he was denied an opportunity to pursue his own
defense, he was prejudiced by the violation of the attorney-client privilege. Id The denial of
Bloom's motion for severance, therefore, was outside the trial court's discretion and as such,
the Seventh Circuit reversed Bloom's conviction and remanded his case so that he could be
given another trial in which to pursue his own defense free from that of his co-defendant. Id.
at 9.
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Walters unfortunately will stand as a signal to sports agents that no mat-
ter how effective the current general criminal statutes appear, numerous
defenses are available to allow sports agents to escape their reach.
C. Criminal Liability of Sports Agents as it Exists Today
Although the government successfully prosecuted its case at trial,
Walters nevertheless illustrates some of the problems with applying the
current federal statutes against sports agents. 304 First, many of the fed-
eral statutes examined in Walters, especially RICO, have been criticized
for their overuse and misapplication .30  This criticism has resulted in a
continual narrowing of RICO's scope in an attempt to limit its applica-
tion to the traditional offenses outlined in the statute.30 6 Second, Wal-
ters' and Bloom's physical threats and acts of violence30 7 separated them
from the large majority of practicing sports agents. It appears that it was
because of this egregious conduct that the government decided to investi-
gate and prosecute the two agents. The current federal statutes appear to
be broad enough to address more typical examples of widespread agent
abuses such as the payment of money to student-athletes prior to the
expiration of their collegiate eligibility and agents instructing student-
athletes to keep representation agreements secret until the athlete's col-
legiate eligibility has expired. However, absent egregious conduct similar
to that of Walters and Bloom, it is doubtful that any agent misconduct
will be identified. Third, the fact that Walters and Bloom publicized
their activities and sought action against their clients 308 assisted the gov-
304. For a discussion of all of Walters' and Bloom's activities, see supra text accompanying
notes 166-80.
305. See Getzendanner, Judicial "Pruning" of "Garden Variety Fraud" Civil RICO Cases
Does Not Work- It's Time for Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REV. 673, 674 (1990) (commenting
how most civil RICO cases "should not be in federal court [since they] involve commonplace
commercial controversies [that are] recharacterized by resourceful attorneys to conform with
the requirements of RICO.. .. "); Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being A Criminal Parts I & II,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 662-63 (1987) (noting that "prosecutors have relied [on the expansive
nature of RICO] to strike at those-whether or not they fit any ordinary definition of 'racke-
teer' or 'organized criminal'--who commit crimes in conducting the affairs of businesses .... "
(footnotes omitted)); Rasmussen, Introductory Remarks and a Comment on Civil RICO's Re-
medial Provisions, 43 VAND. L. REV. 623, 623 (1990) (noting that Justice Antonin Scalia and
three other Supreme Court Justices threatened to find RICO unconstitutionally vague when
presented with the appropriate case in the future).
306. See Dennis, Jr., Current RICO Policies of the Department of Justice, 43 VAND. L. REV.
651, 655 (1990) (stating that "the federal courts have reacted [to RICO's overuse] by reinter-
preting RICO more narrowly ..." (citations omitted)); Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much Is
Needed?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 639, 643 (1990) (noting that the Department of Justice has re-
cently exercised restraint in its use of RICO).
307. See supra text accompanying note 187.
308. See supra text accompanying note 177.
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eminent in establishing its case. Finally, no matter what the law reads,
defense attorneys will raise a barrage of various defenses in an attempt to
exclude sports agents from the scope of the statutes. Even though these
defenses were unsuccessful before the trial court in Walters, the Seventh
Circuit reversed Walters' and Bloom's convictions based on two proce-
dural theories of defense raised on appeal. 30 9 Additionally, other de-
fenses may prove to be successful in the future as more cases come before
the courts.
Besides the numerous defenses available to sports agents, the scope
of the federal statutes presents another problem. Although RICO310 is
an exceptionally broad statute, it requires the violation of a RICO predi-
cate offense3 1 in order to take effect. The majority of these predicate
offenses do not incorporate the typical sports agent abuses that plague
the profession.31 2 Only the more atypical agent activities, such as ex-
torting student athletes through physical threats, fall under the purview
of RICO.313 The same problem exists with the Hobbs Act.31 4 Since, in
all likelihood, the majority of agents do not resort to threatening their
clients with physical harm in attempting to maintain a contractual agree-
ment, these statutes do not apply. The mail fraud
1 5 and conspiracy 316
statutes appear to be broad enough to encompass some of the more "typi-
cal" agent conduct; however, the government generally prosecutes these
violations in conjunction with other "more substantive" offenses.
Although the state statutes are more detailed, and they explicitly
address sports agent conduct, they possess their own set of problems.
First, only nineteen states currently have statutes regulating sports
agents. Further, many of these provide only minimal criminal sanctions,
if any. As illustrated in Abernethy v. State,317 a state without the aid of
specific statutes designed to regulate sports agents will have a difficult
time prosecuting a sports agent under a "general" sports statute such as
309. See United States v. Walters, 711 F. Supp. 1435, 1439-5 1 (N.D. II. 1989), rev'd, Nos.
89-2352, 89-2353, 89-3285, 89-3286, slip op. (7th Cir. Sept. 17, 1990).
310. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
311. Id. § 1961.
312. Typical agent problems such as income mismanagement, excessive fees, conflicts of
interest, incompetence, and overly-aggressive client recruitment practices, normally do not in-
volve RICO predicate offenses. See id. § 1961(1).
313. See id.
314. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988). See supra notes 227-45 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the Hobbs Act.
315. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
316. Id. §§ 371, 1962(d).
317. 545 So. 2d 185 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988). See supra notes 66-95 and accompanying text
for a discussion of this case.
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"tampering with a sports contest."31 Second, state statutes are limited
in their scope due to jurisdictional restrictions.319 Ohio is the only state
that incorporates a long-arm statute into its act.32° Ohio's long-arm pro-
vision enables an Ohio court to "exercise personal jurisdiction over a
[non-resident] agent ... as to a cause of action arising from the athlete
agent entering into an agent contract with [an Ohio collegian even when
the athlete is outside the state]."132' However, many agents have at-
tempted to avoid this provision through out-of-state solicitations and se-
cret signings.a22 Third, many state statutes, such as California's, contain
exemptions for attorneys or financial managers.323 These exemptions
most likely insulate a large population of sports agents from the effect of
the statute. Finally, the majority of state statutes provide only a general
regulatory scheme of licensing and registration requirements. 324
Although these features are important, the statutes do not explicitly ad-
dress substantive agent misconduct-the area most in need of prohibi-
tory sanctions.
V. A RECOMMENDATION FOR A FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTE
TAILORED FOR SPORTS AGENTS
Prominent sports agent Mike Trope once stated that he will not
heed regulations unless they are "laws of the United States and you can
go to prison for ten years if you break them. ' 325 Although Trope's view
may not represent the majority of sports agents, it clearly illustrates the
need for federal criminal sanctions. Sports agents operate in an ex-
tremely competitive environment where gaining an edge on a competitor
lures many into "breaking the rules. 3a26 However, if there are either no
rules to follow or no substantial penalties for violating existing rules,
sports agents seeking to survive and prosper in this competitive environ-
ment may find few deterrents in choosing to pursue an improper course
of conduct.
318. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-143 (1982).
319. Comment, supra note 14, at 1051, 1057, 1062, 1078.
320. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4771.06 (Page Supp. 1988).
321. Id.
322. Ehrhardt & Rodgers, supra note 22, at 57.
323. See, eg., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1500(b) (West 1989). The attorney exemption only ap-
plies to certain provisions of the California Act. For example, California licensed attorneys are
not required to post a $25,000 surety bond. Id. § 1519. But see id. §§ 1530.5, 1531(c), 1535.5,
1539 (including members of the California Bar within the section's coverage).
324. See, e.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-48-101 to -203 (Supp. 1989); CAL. LAB. CODE
§§ 1500-1547 (West 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 9A.1-.12 (West 1989).
325. McLeese, A Whole New Ballgamefor Lawyers, STUDENT LAW., Oct. 1980, at 40, 46.
326. See Ehrhardt & Rodgers, supra note 22, at 40-43.
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The concept of federal statutory regulation of sports agents is hardly
new.327 Any proposal for federal regulation, however, must look beyond
mere licensing and registration requirements. A comprehensive federal
scheme should include prohibitory sanctions against the current wide-
spread agent abuses.
First, the legislation needs to include a provision making it a felony
for a sports agent to sign an athlete to a representation agreement before
the athlete's collegiate eligibility has expired.32 Second, the legislation
should make any payments to a student-athlete illegal, when such pay-
ments are either in exchange for a signed representation agreement or in
promise for the same sometime in the future. These two provisions
would harmonize the proposed federal regulation of sports agents with
the current NCAA rules governing amateur athletics, whose purpose is
to delay the professionalization of college athletes until their collegiate
eligibility expires.329 Currently, the NCAA rules have no enforcement
power; therefore, this part of the proposed federal legislation is necessary
to successfully address the NCAA's current concerns. By criminalizing
"early" and "purchased" representation agreements, the legislation
would respect the purpose of the NCAA rules by restricting agents from
using their persuasive skills to lure college athletes into signing represen-
tation agreements that violate NCAA rules.
Third, the legislation should include specific rules regarding the so-
licitation of collegiate athletes. A comprehensive statute addressing this
problem should prohibit agents from providing "anything of significant
value"330 to a player in order to solicit that player as a client, or to any-
327. In 1982, the National Sports Lawyers Association began drafting a proposed federal
statute to regulate sports agents, the Professional Sports Agency Act of 1985. This has yet to
be introduced before Congress. Comment, supra note 14, at 1069.
328. See, eg., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
329. See NCAA CONST. art. 11-2(a). It should be noted that a large number of respected
commentators have criticized the current NCAA rules governing amateur athletics. See, e.g.,
Roberts, Protecting the College Athlete from Unscrupulous Agents, 5 SPORTS LAw. 8 (1987);
Klein, College Football: Keeping 'em Barefoot, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1987, at 13, col. 1. This
criticism generally attacks the NCAA rules prohibiting collegiate athletes from receiving any
money (including from outside employment) without forfeiting their amateur status. One
commentator observed that the NCAA rules require athletes "to live by utopian standards"
and to "take a kind of vow of poverty when they accept college [athletic] scholarships." Rob-
erts, supra, at 8; see also Klein, supra, at 13, col. 1. Other commentators have observed that
the NCAA rules are the product of a "decades-long gentlemen's agreement between the NFL
and the college powers-that-be" and that this has allowed "[t]he pros [to] get a free farm
system that supplies them with well-trained, much-publicized employees" while "[t]he colleges
get to keep their players the equivalent of barefoot and pregnant." Id. at 13, col. 2. See Sobel,
supra note 2, at 783-85 for further criticism of the current NCAA rules.
330. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-26-33 (Supp. 1989).
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one else, in return for a personal recommendation. Also, similar to a
provision adopted by the National Football League Players' Associa-
tion,331 the statute should prohibit agents from providing false or mis-
leading information to anyone in the context of soliciting clients,
including the use of titles or business names implying professional cre-
dentials which the agent does not have. Additionally, like the California
and Alabama acts, the statute should prohibit agents from offering any-
thing of value, including free or reduced-price legal services, to college
employees in return for client referrals.3 32
Fourth, the legislation should include provisions for the crimes of
extortion, mail and wire fraud, embezzlement, racketeering and conspir-
acy, in language similar to that of the existing federal statutes discussed
in part in United States v. Walters. 3 By incorporating these provisions,
this uniquely tailored legislation would address egregious agent conduct
in a single body of law recognized to govern the profession, rather than
the current scheme which attempts to fit sports agent conduct into more
general statutes.
Fifth, the legislation should adopt provisions in addition to those in
existing federal statutes, thereby creating a package of laws designed to
deal with the unique problems created by the sports agent profession.
These provisions should address the types of misconduct, such as income
mismanagement, excessive fees, conflicts of interest and overly aggressive
client recruitment practices,334 that ordinarily stem from the general
functions that sports agents perform. By addressing these problems cur-
rently plaguing the profession, in strict prohibitory language accompa-
nied by equally strict criminal penalty provisions making these practices
a felony, the legislation should serve as an effective deterrent to willful
athlete agent misconduct.
Finally, of course, in order for the criminal sanctions to be effective,
the legislation should contain registration and licensing requirements
similar to those found in the Alabama and California statutes.3 35 Unlike
many state statutory schemes, however, no exemptions should be given.
331. NFLPA REG. § 5(c) (1983).
332. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 8-26-34(b) (Supp. 1989); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1539(b) (West
1989).
333. 711 F. Supp. 1435 (N.D. Ill. 1989), rev'd, Nos. 89-2352, 89-2353, 89-3285, 89-3286,
slip op. (7th Cir. Sept. 17, 1990). See supra notes 198-297 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of these federal statutes.
334. See Sobel, supra note 2, at 710 (discussion of sports agent misconduct).
335. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-4 to -10 (Supp. 1989); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1510-1528 (West
1989). For a discussion of proposed federal regulations specifically regarding registration re-
quirements, see Comment, supra note 14, at 1074-78.
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Any person practicing as a sports agent under the broadest of definitions
should be within the scope of the statute. Additionally, as is the case in
several statutory schemes, failure to register as a sports agent under the
legislation's guidelines should be a felony.336 Only a comprehensive
piece of legislation, void of any loopholes, can effectively address today's
sports agents abuses and serve as a deterrent to this "new breed" of
white-collar crime.
VI. CONCLUSION
There was a time when the stereotypical agent was the gutsy charac-
ter who took on the "big bad owner" and wrung from him what was due
to the athlete.337 But as athletes started making hundreds of thousands
of dollars, then millions, ethical agents watched helplessly as the self-
serving, the incompetent, and indeed, the criminal, debased the profes-
sion's image.338 Unfortunately, such is the current status of a profession
which lacks any enforceable set of uniform rules or regulations to help
guard against widespread misconduct such as income mismanagement,
excessive fees, conflicts of interest and overly-aggressive client recruit-
ment practices.
The majority of sports agents possess a sharp business acumen that
allows them to skillfully maneuver around any potential civil liability.
Additionally, non-legislative regulation, such as professional association
rules, involve non-mandatory membership and, accordingly, lack any de-
veloped enforcement mechanisms for compliance. Finally, although
some attempts at legislative regulation avoid these problems, they are
typically fraught with jurisdictional limitations, exemptions, insignificant
penalties for violations and other loopholes. Such legislative schemes
generally lack the necessary structure to address existing problems in the
profession.
Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom represent just two examples of the
undoubtedly countless number of sports agents who operate their busi-
nesses illegally and unethically, consciously aware that very little can or
will be done to prevent this conduct. The only solution to deal with this
problem of sports agent misconduct is a comprehensive federal statute
tailored to address the unique work of sports agents. Congress must take
336. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 8-26-41 (Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.453(3) (West
Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-11(a) (Harrison Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
46-4 (Bums Supp. 1989); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 518.080(2) (MVichie/Bobbs-MerriU Supp.
1988).
337. Neff, Den of Vipers, supra note 3, at 76.
338. Id.
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the initiative and "reline the playing field" of this multi-million dollar
profession with a powerful and exhaustive piece of legislation that can
spark more desireable attitudes and conduct in sports agents. Only then
will the public and sports world's perception of athlete agents improve,
thereby shifting the focus back to the plethora of beneficial services that
sports agents provide athletes, and providing the group a new revitalized
public image as "good agents."
Ash Narayanan*
* The author's work on this Comment has inspired the formation of Pro-Am Manage-
ment, Inc. © ("Pro-Am"), an athletic management firm. As a co-founder, the author will
strive to ensure that Pro-Am embody the spirit of this Comment. The author also wishes to
thank Professor Lon Sobel for his editorial comments.
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